The Relevance (and Irrelevance) of Questions of Personhood (and Mindedness) to the Abortion Debate

David Kyle Johnson

Vol. 1, No. 2

Fall 2019

Pages: 121-153

The Relevance (and Irrelevance) of Questions of Personhood (and Mindedness) to the Abortion Debate

DOI: 10.33929/sherm.2019.vol1.no2.02

ORCID_logo_with_tagline.svg.png

Abstract

More from the Author

Rational Faith.png
Rational Faith.png

Philosophy

David Kyle Johnson, Abortion, Personhood, Mindedness, Sapience, Sentience, Pro-Life, Pro-Choice, Self-awareness, Roe v. Wade

Disagreements about abortion are often assumed to reduce to disagreements about fetal personhood (and mindedness). If one believes a fetus is a person (or has a mind), then they are “pro-life.” If one believes a fetus is not a person (or is not minded), they are “pro-choice.” The issue, however, is much more complicated. Not only is it not dichotomous—most everyone believes that abortion is permissible in some circumstances (e.g. to save the mother’s life) and not others (e.g. at nine months of a planned pregnancy)—but scholars on both sides of the issue (e.g. Don Marquis and Judith Thomson) have convincingly argued that fetal personhood (and mindedness) are irrelevant to the debate. To determine the extent to which they are right, this article will define “personhood,” its relationship to mindedness, and explore what science has revealed about the mind before exploring the relevance of both to questions of abortion’s morality and legality. In general, this article does not endorse a particular answer to these questions, but the article should enhance the reader’s ability to develop their own answers in a much more informed way.

Preview

Davis, Stephen vol 2, no 2 PREVIEW_Page_
$1.99

$1.99

dimensions_logo_400x80.png
SHERM Front Cover - no glow.png

Print Issue

$23.25

ATLA 3.jpg
ORCID_Cert_Service_Provider_logo[&vF].pn
crossref-members.png