Supernatural Resurrection and its Incompatibility with the Standard Model of Particle Physics
Robert Greg Cavin; Carlos A. Colombetti
Vol. 3, No. 2
Resurrection Hypothesis, Resurrection, Stephen T. Davis, Robert Greg Cavin, Carlos A. Colombetti, Particle Physics, Counter-Apologetics, Apologetics, Standard Model, Explanatory Scope, Explanatory Power, Miracles, Soma Pneumatikon, William Lane Craig, Inference to the Best Explanation, Criteria of Adequacy
In response to Stephen Davis’s criticism of our previous essay, we revisit and defend our arguments that the Resurrection hypothesis is logically incompatible with the Standard Model of particle physics—and thus is maximally implausible—and that it cannot explain the sensory experiences of the Risen Jesus attributed to various witnesses in the New Testament—and thus has low explanatory power. We also review Davis’s reply, noting that he evades our arguments, misstates their conclusions, and distracts the reader with irrelevancies regarding, e.g., what natural laws are, what a miracle is, and how “naturalism” and “supernaturalism” differ as worldviews. Contrary to what Davis claims (even in his abstract), we do not argue that “if the Standard Model of particle physics (SM) is true, then the resurrection of Jesus did not occur and physical things can only causally interact with other physical things.” Davis distorts our claims and criticizes straw men of his own creation.